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I. INTRODUCTION 
For most of the period associated with the Industrial Revolution in 
Britain, English law restricted access to incorporation and the Bubble 
Act explicitly outlawed the formation of unincorporated joint stock com-
panies with transferable shares. Furthermore, firms in the manufacturing 
industries most closely associated with the Industrial Revolution were 
overwhelmingly partnerships. These two facts have led some scholars to 
posit that the antiquated business organization law was a constraint on 
the structural transformation and growth that characterized the British 
economy during the period. For example, Professor Ron Harris argues 
that the limitation on the joint stock form was “less than satisfactory in 
terms of overall social costs, efficient allocation of resources, and even-
tually the rate of growth of the English economy.”1 
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 1. RON HARRIS, INDUSTRIALIZING ENGLISH LAW: ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATION, 1720–1844, at 167 (2000). There are numerous other examples of this and related 
arguments in the literature. While acknowledging that, to a large extent, restrictions on the joint 
stock form could be overcome by alternative arrangements, Nick Crafts nonetheless argues that 
“institutional weaknesses relating to . . . company legislation . . . must have had some inhibiting 
effects both on savers and on business investment.” Nick Crafts, The Industrial Revolution, in 1 THE 
ECONOMIC HISTORY OF BRITAIN SINCE 1700, at 44, 52 (Roderick Floud & Donald N. McCloskey 
eds., 1994). Peter Mathias argues that “[t]here was almost no incorporation allowed for manufactur-
ing industry or limitations of liability for investors in industry—with no appeal possible for public 
subscriptions for transferable shares.” Peter Mathias, Financing the Industrial Revolution, in THE 
FIRST INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTIONS 69, 73 (Peter Mathias & John A. Davis eds., 1990). Herbert A. 
Shannon asserts that “the general movement [to joint stock enterprise] could not take place until 
certain economic and legal changes had been effected . . . . The legal change was the substitution of 
the law of corporations for the law of partnership . . . . But before the legal changes of 1844 and 
1855, English law virtually prohibited joint-stock enterprise for ordinary trading and manufacturing 
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The primary mechanism by which the restrictions on access to the 
joint stock form could have influenced Britain’s economic performance 
is by hindering capital accumulation, which was a substantial source of 
economic growth during the Industrial Revolution. While the growth of 
Britain’s capital stock was not as rapid as once thought, the modern con-
sensus is that there was a gradual increase in the share of expenditure 
devoted to investment, with the investment rate roughly doubling be-
tween 1760 and 1830.2 In addition to an increase in the overall invest-
ment rate, a gradual structural change took place with industry receiving 
an increasing share of capital investment.3 Capital accumulation and 
growth were most dramatic in the “modern sector,” which included cot-
ton textiles, iron smelting and refining, engineering, chemicals, mining, 
transportation, pottery, and paper.4 From the 1760s onward, the output of 
the cotton textile and iron industries in particular accelerated dramatical-
ly.5 
Importantly, however, the vast majority of manufacturing firms in 
the modern sector were partnerships.6 An easy explanation for the pre-
dominance of partnerships is that the legal restrictions on access to the 
joint stock form gave entrepreneurs no other choice of legal vehicle for 
their collective enterprises. It is not a large leap to then argue that these 
restrictions inhibited the development of the English economy. Those 
who make this argument implicitly envision a counterfactual in which 
legal restrictions on the joint stock form were absent, firms in the modern 
sector used the joint stock form to access external sources of funds to 
finance investment, and consequently capital accumulation and output 
accelerated more rapidly in the modern sector.7 
                                                                                                             
purposes.” Herbert A. Shannon, Coming of General Limited Liability, 2 ECON. HIST. 267, 267 
(1931). Bishop C. Hunt argues that because of the Bubble Act, “there seems to be no doubt that for 
upwards of a hundred years, industry was deprived of capital which in other circumstances would 
have been available.” BISHOP C. HUNT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN 
ENGLAND 1800–1867, at 9 (1936). 
 2. NICHOLAS F. R. CRAFTS, BRITISH ECONOMIC GROWTH DURING THE INDUSTRIAL 
REVOLUTION 73 (1985). 
 3. Id. at 122–25. 
 4. For discussion of a two-sector (modern and traditional) model of the British economy during 
the Industrial Revolution, see Joel Mokyr, Editor’s Introduction: The New Economic History and the 
Industrial Revolution, in THE BRITISH INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 1, 13 
(Joel Mokyr ed., 1993). 
 5. See Crafts, supra note 1, at 48–49. 
 6. See P. L.  COTTRELL, INDUSTRIAL FINANCE 1830–1914: THE FINANCE AND ORGANIZATION 
OF ENGLISH MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY 19 (1980); M. M. Postan, Recent Trends in the Accumula-
tion of Capital, 6 ECON. HIST. REV. 1, 4 (1935). While the partnership form was predominant, the 
joint stock form was used occasionally, and was used extensively in the woolen textile industry. 
 7. Harris explicitly hypothesizes such a counterfactual. See HARRIS, supra note 1, at 292. 
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The goal of this Essay is to challenge this view and to point towards 
other possible explanations for industrial entrepreneurs’ use of the part-
nership form. In short, the restrictions on access to the joint stock form 
lacked bite. While firms did not have general access to incorporation un-
til 1844, creative businessmen and lawyers crafted an alternative legal 
form—the unincorporated joint stock company—that served as a func-
tional replacement for the business corporation. Restrictions on unincor-
porated joint stock companies were unenforced and largely ignored. 
Thus, the use of the partnership by entrepreneurs in the modern sector 
must be understood as a choice; the law did not dictate their firms’ legal 
form. 
Understanding that the unincorporated joint stock company was an 
option leaves a puzzle that has largely gone untreated in the literature: 
Why were most manufacturing firms in the modern sector partnerships? 
Legal characteristics of the partnership form made it difficult for partner-
ships to attract outside equity investment from impersonal, formal capital 
markets and thereby may have limited the amount of capital that could be 
aggregated in a single firm. In particular, joint and several liability of 
partners for the obligations of the partnership surely gave outside inves-
tors pause in taking an equity position in a partnership. Partnership inter-
ests lacked the liquidity of transferable joint stock shares with an active 
secondary market. Furthermore, partnerships did not have the default 
liquidation protection of joint stock firms; partners’ personal creditors 
could force partial liquidation of the firm’s assets. With all of these defi-
ciencies, why then were manufacturing firms in the modern sector over-
whelmingly organized as partnerships? 
I propose a resolution of this puzzle based on the pecking order 
theory of corporate finance. For the vast majority of firms in the modern 
sector it was optimal to use only debt, not equity, for any external financ-
ing. Industrial entrepreneurs chose the partnership form because it mini-
mized the costs of debt financing. The unlimited liability of partners gave 
firm creditors additional collateral and provided better incentives against 
opportunism by partners, thereby lowering the cost of credit to the firm. 
Furthermore, the tighter nexus between control and residual financial 
claims in the partnership form resulted in better incentives for the owner-
managers to exert effort and make efficient decisions in running the firm. 
I begin in Part II with a short overview of the early history of the 
joint stock form in England. I then turn in Part III to the legal framework 
for business organization during the Industrial Revolution and explain 
that the supposed restrictions on organizing as a joint stock company 
were not binding. Part IV develops an explanation based on the pecking 
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order theory of corporate finance for why industrial entrepreneurs none-
theless organized their businesses as partnerships. 
II. EARLY HISTORY OF THE JOINT STOCK FORM IN ENGLAND 
Before describing the restrictions on access to the joint stock form 
during the period of interest, it is helpful first to recount briefly the pre-
ceding history of the joint stock form and the development of early capi-
tal market institutions in England.8 
Until 1844, corporations could only be formed by an act of Parlia-
ment or a charter granted by the Crown. In the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, the Crown typically granted incorporation in combination with 
exclusive rights over trade in a particular region or over a particular in-
dustry.9 This practice served as a revenue generating mechanism for the 
state.10 In this manner, many of the great trading companies of the era 
were formed, such as the Hudson’s Bay Company, the East India Com-
pany, and the Russia Company.11 The practice of granting monopoly 
rights with incorporation declined over the course of the seventeenth cen-
tury, but the association of incorporation with monopoly remained strong 
among the general public. After the 1680s, as the relative power of Par-
liament rose, the route to incorporation became increasingly by an act of 
Parliament.12 
In the period roughly between 1690 and 1725, the first key ingredi-
ents of a modern capital market developed in England. First and foremost 
among these was the development of a market for government securities. 
Under William of Orange, the government began issuing perpetual annu-
ities made free of risk of default.13 Three chartered business corporations 
rose to ascendancy in this period: the East India Company, the Bank of 
England, and the South Sea Company.14 These so-called “moneyed com-
panies” played a unique role in facilitating the financing of the govern-
ment debt, and their success was associated with legal privileges that 
granted them exclusive rights and restricted entry into their markets. The 
success of these financial innovations facilitated the development of the 
first stock market institutions in London, including a stock exchange, 
                                                 
 8. The account that follows draws on HARRIS, supra note 1, at 40–59. 
 9. Id. at 40–41. 
 10. See COLIN COOKE, CORPORATION TRUST AND COMPANY 54–56 (1950). 
 11. HARRIS, supra note 1, at 43–49. 
 12. Id. at 53. 
 13. Larry Neal, Finance of Business During the Industrial Revolution, in 1 THE ECONOMIC 
HISTORY OF BRITAIN SINCE 1700, at 151 (R. C. Floud & D. N. McCloskey eds., 2d ed. 1994). 
 14. HARRIS, supra note 1, at 53. 
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financial press, and securities brokers, which primarily focused on gov-
ernment obligations. 
In turn, the development of primitive capital market institutions led 
to a boom in joint stock company formation. By 1695, some 150 joint 
stock companies were in existence.15 However, with the important excep-
tion of the moneyed companies, most of these companies were short-
lived, and by 1717, only three companies other than the moneyed com-
panies were listed on the Course of the Exchange, an early financial pub-
lication.16 
This development of the first capital market institutions in England, 
known as the “Financial Revolution,” was primarily focused on public 
finance rather than the finance of business. On the eve of the Industrial 
Revolution, the London stock exchange still played little role in funnel-
ing savings into private capital investment. 
III. RESTRICTIONS ON THE JOINT STOCK FORM DURING THE  
INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries there were two main 
basic legal forms for collective business enterprise in England: the corpo-
ration and the partnership. It is clear that both Parliament and the Crown 
refused to grant many petitions for incorporation, thereby restricting ac-
cess to the corporate form. In contrast, partnerships could be formed 
among private parties by simple agreement and were thus freely availa-
ble. A third legal form was developed, the unincorporated joint stock 
company, which used the basic partnership form supplemented by trust 
law to create an organization with legal features that could support trans-
ferable equity interests without incorporation. The debate over the impact 
of legal restrictions on the joint stock form largely revolves around these 
firms. While some doubt the effectiveness of the unincorporated joint 
stock company as a substitute for incorporation, its alleged inadequacies 
were not substantial enough to prevent its expanding use throughout the 
period. 
A. Restrictions on Access to the Corporate Form 
It is uncontroversial that access to the corporate form was restricted 
during most of the Industrial Revolution. Entrepreneurs sought incorpo-
ration in various industries but met with limited success.17 Royal officials 
                                                 
 15. Id. at 57. 
 16. Id. at 58. 
 17. See COOKE, supra note 10, at 92. 
342 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 38:337 
and Parliament considered petitions for incorporation using “public poli-
cy” as their criterion. But potential competitors of petitioners often raised 
objections to the petitions, framed in public interest language but certain-
ly aimed to further the interests of the objectors, and petitions were fre-
quently rejected. Incorporation was sought with particular frequency in 
the insurance sector, for which the limitation on liability of shareholders 
ensured by incorporation was of particular importance. For example, in 
1757, Equitable Assurance petitioned for a charter and, after four years 
of hearings and reports, was denied.18 The recommendation of denial 
made by the law officers explicitly stated the motive as in part to prevent 
competition with existing firms in the insurance market.19 In manufactur-
ing too, incorporation was occasionally sought and typically denied. In 
1783, the Albion Steam Flour Mill petitioned for incorporation but was 
denied after lobbying by nearby millers.20 
Firms that were successful in obtaining a charter were often in in-
dustries that required large lump sum capital and additional legal privi-
leges in order to succeed. In particular, the petitions of canal companies 
often met with success. These firms typically sought incorporation both 
to enable them to issue transferable shares to raise the substantial sum of 
capital required to finance river improvements and to secure the im-
portant right of eminent domain from the government.21 Harris offers a 
sensible explanation for the success of canal companies in obtaining 
charters: canal companies generally were local natural monopolies and 
thus had few competitors to lobby against them.22 
B. Unincorporated Joint Stock Company as a Substitute for  
Incorporation 
Faced with difficulty in obtaining incorporation from the Crown or 
Parliament, many entrepreneurs used the unincorporated joint stock 
company to obtain the legal characteristics necessary to issue transfera-
ble equity interests and raise additional capital. To understand the prob-
                                                 
 18. HARRIS, supra note 1, at 102–03. 
 19. The law officers wrote: 
The business of insuring lives is carried on, not only by [the three existing companies] 
but such policies are duly underwrittten by numbers of private persons. Therefore, the 
law officers could not advise the Crown to trench upon the rights given to the three exist-
ing companies on the bare request of any set of men, without a clearer and more certain 
prospect of public good. 
HUNT, supra note 1, at 11–12. 
 20. Gary M. Anderson & Robert D. Tollison, The Myth of the Corporation as a Creation of the 
State, 3 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 107, 113 (1983). 
 21. HARRIS, supra note 1, at 90–100. 
 22. Id. at 108–09. 
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lems that this more complex legal form solved, it is helpful first to under-
stand the difficulties inherent in gathering a large capital stock from 
many equity investors using the partnership form. 
1. Problems with the Partnership 
Unlike corporations, partnerships were not conceptualized as “legal 
persons.”23 Lacking this metaphorical attribute resulted in several practi-
cal problems in expanding the size of the partnership and its capital 
stock, principally with respect to transferability of shares, the liability of 
partners, liquidation protection, centralized governance, and the ability to 
litigate in its own name. 
(a). Transferability 
Since partnerships were formed by agreement of the partners, any 
change in the identity of the partners required a new agreement between 
all partners.24 Partnerships incurred substantial transaction costs in reor-
ganizing the firm upon transfer of partnership interests. 
(b). Limited Liability 
A further difficulty was that equity owners in partnerships were 
jointly and severally liable for the debts of the partnership, meaning that 
firm creditors could sue any individual partner for the full amount of the 
firm’s debt.25 This meant that any partner, no matter how small their 
share in the firm, faced potentially large personal liability if the firm 
failed. The lack of limited liability for partners clearly made it difficult to 
attract impersonal equity investment in the partnership.26 
(c). Liquidation Protection 
Unlike corporations, assets in partnerships were potentially availa-
ble to the personal creditors of a bankrupt partner. Furthermore, absent 
restrictions in the partnership agreement, a partnership was generally “at 
will,” and an individual partner could withdraw from the partnership and 
                                                 
 23. Id. at 21. 
 24. See id. at 142; COTTRELL, supra note 6, at 39. 
 25. TOM HADDEN, COMPANY LAW AND CAPITALISM 28 (1972). 
 26. See HUNT, supra note 1, at 81–82. The limited partnership form, in which some “sleeping” 
partners had limited liability but could not share in control of the firm and which played an im-
portant role in this period on the Continent, was not available in England until 1907. Naomi R. 
Lamoreaux & Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, Legal Regime and Contract Flexibility: A Comparison of 
Business’s Organizational Choices in France and the United States during the Era of Industrializa-
tion, 7 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 28, 55 (2005). 
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take his share of the assets of the firm. Thus, partners’ personal creditors, 
and potentially the partners themselves, could force a partial liquidation 
of the firm, threatening the firm’s going concern value.27 Partnerships ran 
the risk that the value of firm-specific investment, including human and 
physical capital, might be lost due to premature liquidation of the firm.28 
The severity of this problem scaled with the number of partners. 
(d). Centralized Governance 
Partnerships also had difficulty establishing a centralized govern-
ance structure. The common law rule was that each partner could serve 
as an agent of the partnership and thus could bind the partnership to con-
tracts and dispose of firm assets.29 This posed a difficulty in raising capi-
tal by selling a large number of partnership interests; each partner could 
potentially act as a firm agent, binding the firm. Intrapartnership moni-
toring became more costly as the number of partners increased. While 
these powers could be restricted in the partnership agreement, such re-
strictions would only serve to give the partners a cause of action against 
a partner who violated them, and the firm generally would still be bound 
to a contract made by a partner on behalf of the partnership in violation 
of such a restriction. 
(e). Litigation in Its Own Name 
In legal proceedings initiated by and against the partnership, every 
partner had to be joined as a party.30 The inability to litigate in its own 
name made it difficult for creditors to bring actions enforcing their rights 
and thereby drove up the cost of credit for large partnerships. Again, this 
cost scaled with the size of the partnership. 
These problems made it difficult for a secondary market in shares 
of a partnership to form, thus making partnership interests illiquid. Part-
nerships could economize on these costs by remaining small and keeping 
the partnership among a group of close associates. These problems put a 
limit on the ability of partnerships to aggregate equity capital and thus 
made the partnership unworkable for enterprises that required large 
                                                 
 27. Henry Hansmann & Renier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 
YALE L.J. 387, 403 (2000). Hansmann and Kraakman use the term “weak form entity shielding” to 
describe organizational forms that give priority to firm creditors over personal creditors of owners 
but do not provide liquidation protection. Id. 
 28. Henry Hansmann, Renier Kraakman & Richard Squire, Law and the Rise of the Firm, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 1333, 1348–50 (2006). 
 29. HARRIS, supra note 1, at 144. 
 30. HUNT, supra note 1, at 82. 
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lump-sum fixed capital investments, such as railroad and canal compa-
nies. 
2. Legal Innovations of the Unincorporated Joint Stock Company 
Faced with the problems of the partnership form and general una-
vailability of incorporation by the Crown or act of Parliament, entrepre-
neurs and their lawyers devised an alternative set of legal arrange-
ments—the unincorporated joint stock company—that enabled the issu-
ance of transferable equity interests and facilitated the aggregation of 
larger sums of capital. A typical unincorporated joint stock company was 
formed by the initial shareholders executing a deed of settlement that 
contained the firm’s articles of association and established an equitable 
trust.31 The assets of the firm were placed in the trust, and the deed of 
settlement contained covenants that bound the shareholders and set forth 
the governance structure of the company. Each shareholder’s stock in the 
firm was also held by the trust. The trust device was used to overcome 
the simple partnership’s lack of legal personality. Just as the corporation 
was considered the owner of its own assets held for the benefit of share-
holders, so the trust held the firm’s assets, with the shareholders owning 
an equitable interest in the assets as beneficiaries of the trust.32 
While some scholars dispute the efficacy of this legal structure in 
addressing the deficiencies of the partnership form, the weight of the ev-
idence suggests that the unincorporated joint stock company was an ef-
fective substitute for incorporation. 
(a). Transferability 
The deed of settlement typically allowed for the free transferability 
of shares and included a provision that every person to whom a share 
was transferred would execute a contract binding him to the terms of the 
deed of settlement and would assign the share to the trust. The trustees of 
the firm would effect the transaction; approval of the other shareholders 
was not required.33 
                                                 
 31. For a general description of the typical legal structure of an unincorporated joint stock 
company, see COOKE, supra note 10, at 85–88; Anderson & Tollison, supra note 20, at 109–11. 
 32. See Paddy Ireland, Capitalism Without the Capitalist: The Joint Stock Company Share and 
the Emergence of the Modern Doctrine of Separate Corporate Personality, 17 LEGAL HIST. 41, 49 
(1996). Indeed, Ireland argues that the reified conception of the company arose through the emer-
gence of an understanding of the nature of the joint stock company share as an autonomous form of 
property. Id. at 48–50. 
 33. Anderson & Tollison, supra note 20, at 110. 
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(b). Limited Liability 
Many such companies also included a provision limiting the liabil-
ity of each shareholder for the debts of the firm to the extent of his own 
share in the capital stock.34 The company then included terms in its con-
tracts with third parties that made only the assets of the trust, and not the 
assets of shareholders, available to secure the firm’s obligations.35 Some 
included the term “limited” in the firm’s name and stated the sharehold-
ers’ limited liability on the firm’s letterhead to give further notice to third 
parties and increase the likelihood of enforcement of the limitation of 
liability by courts.36 This practice was rare in the eighteenth century, but 
increasingly common by the early nineteenth century.37 
(c). Liquidation Protection 
The trust device also gave the firm liquidation protection: a creditor 
of an individual shareholder could not obtain the shareholder’s share in 
the firm’s assets until all shareholders had agreed to dissolution of the 
firm.38 
(d). Centralized Governance 
The deed of settlement established a centralized governance struc-
ture, typically providing for a committee of management that was author-
ized to manage the firm and an assembly of shareholders that selected the 
committee of management and voted on major decisions of the firm.39 
Shareholders had no right to bind the firm or dispose of its assets, as the 
assets were held by the trust. 
(e). Litigation in Its Own Name 
The deed of settlement often allowed litigation concerning the firm 
to be held in the name of the trustees or the secretary of the company.40 
                                                 
 34. MARK FREEMAN ET AL., SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACIES? CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN 
BRITAIN AND IRELAND BEFORE 1850, at 190–92 (2011). See also Anderson & Tollison, supra note 
20, at 114. 
 35. Absent provision of notice to third parties, clauses in the articles of association that pur-
ported to limit the liability of shareholders were probably ineffective. See ARMAND BUDINGTON 
DUBOIS, THE ENGLISH BUSINESS COMPANY AFTER THE BUBBLE ACT 1720–1800, at 258 (1938). 
 36. Frederick W. Maitland, Trust and Corporation, in MAITLAND: SELECTED ESSAYS 211 
(Harold D. Hazeltine, Gaillard Lapsley & Percy H. Winfield eds., 1936). 
 37. DUBOIS, supra note 35, at 222–23. 
 38. COTTRELL, supra note 6, at 40–41. See also Hansmann, Kraakman & Squire, supra note 
28, at 1384–85. 
 39. DUBOIS, supra note 35, at 217–18, 305–07. 
 40. Id. at 218. 
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The unincorporated company could then conduct legal proceedings in 
Chancery, which allowed, subject to the discretion of the Chancellor, 
companies to litigate in the name of designated officers.41 Furthermore, 
unincorporated joint stock companies made extensive use of private arbi-
tration, both in resolving disputes among shareholders and with credi-
tors.42 
3. Problems with the Unincorporated Joint Stock Company 
The unincorporated joint stock company was not without its own 
problems and costs. But, as we shall see, these problems were not major 
hurdles to its expanding use in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
and cannot alone explain the use of the partnership in the manufacturing 
industry. 
(a). The Bubble Act 
The infamous Bubble Act has been thought by some to have effect-
ed the outright ban on these companies contained in its words. In 1720, 
Parliament passed “An Act to Restrain the Extravagant and Unwarranta-
ble Practice of Raising Money by Voluntary Subscriptions for Carrying 
on Projects Dangerous to the Trade and Subjects of this Kingdom,” later 
known as the Bubble Act, which provided that “the raising or pretending 
to raise transferable Stock or Stocks, the transferring or pretending to 
transfer or assign any Share or Shares in such Stock or Stocks without 
Legal Authority, either by Act of Parliament or by any Charter from the 
Crown to warrant such acting as a Body Corporate . . . shall for ever be 
deemed to be illegal and void.”43 Furthermore, the Act made violation of 
its proscriptions a criminal offense.44 
However, the Act was mostly sound and fury and had little long-
term significance or effect on the practices of the business community. In 
1722, the first prosecution was brought under the Act against a Francis 
Caywood, who was fined five pounds and sentenced to remain in prison 
“during the King’s pleasure” for promoting a joint stock scheme for trade 
in the North Seas.45 But after that first prosecution, the Act remained 
dormant for some eighty-five years. By mid-century, entrepreneurs were 
increasingly ignoring the provisions of the Act and forming unincorpo-
rated joint stock companies, sometimes adding the proviso in their arti-
                                                 
 41. See DUBOIS, supra note 35, at 220; MAITLAND, supra note 36, at 205. 
 42. DUBOIS, supra note 35, at 221. 
 43. Id. at 2–3. 
 44. Id. at 3. 
 45. Id. at 10–11. 
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cles of association that “nothing therein shall be construed an Undertak-
ing against 6th George I [the Bubble Act].”46 Thus, the modern consen-
sus among scholars is that, by the period associated with the Industrial 
Revolution, the Bubble Act was a dead letter.47 
In 1807, the Crown initiated the first prosecution under the Act 
since the Caywood case. While the court refused to allow the case to 
proceed given the lack of enforcement by the government for so many 
years, the court ominously concluded that “the parties concerned should 
forbear to carry into execution this mischievous project, or any other 
speculative project founded on joint-stock or transferable shares.”48 But 
rather than signaling a revival of the Act, the case set in motion events 
that would lead to its demise, and in 1825 the Bubble Act was repealed.49 
(b). Transaction Costs 
As effective as it was, the complex institutional structure of the un-
incorporated joint stock company did not come for free. Deeds of settle-
ment had to be drafted, trustees sought, and care taken to limit the liabil-
ity of shareholders through clauses in each contract of the firm. There 
were certainly transaction costs attendant with the use of the unincorpo-
rated joint stock company. But it is hard to believe that these costs were 
substantially more than the costs of establishing and running a corpora-
tion.50 In the words of DuBois, “[t]he substitute employed might be a 
trifle more cumbersome or unwieldy, but it was nearly always effec-
tive.”51 
(c). Problems with the Use of the Trust 
Harris puts particular emphasis on difficulties with using the trust 
device for business enterprise. He argues that it was difficult to recruit 
trustees, who faced potential liability for losses in the business due to 
their mismanagement.52 Furthermore, in the traditional law of trusts, trus-
tees were restricted from investing trust funds in risky assets, which 
would presumably have included the assets typical of business enterpris-
                                                 
 46. COTTRELL, supra note 6, at 8. 
 47. See BRIAN R. CHEFFINS, CORPORATE OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: BRITISH BUSINESS 
TRANSFORMED 149 (2008); HARRIS, supra note 1, at 78–81; Paul G. Mahoney, Contract or Conces-
sion? An Essay on the History of Corporate Law, 34 GA. L. REV. 873, 888 (2000). 
 48. HUNT, supra note 1, at 17. 
 49. DUBOIS, supra note 35, at 39. 
 50. See Anderson & Tollison, supra note 20, at 112. 
 51. DUBOIS, supra note 35, at 216. 
 52. See HARRIS, supra note 1, at 154. See also DUBOIS, supra note 35, at 222. 
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es.53 Companies that used the trust device were also restricted to using 
the Court of Chancery for litigation, which was prone to long delays.54 
While these problems with the trust may have made the unincorpo-
rated joint stock company imperfect, they do not seem as severe as Har-
ris suggests. In particular, provisions indemnifying the trustees against 
liabilities incurred on account of acts done on behalf of the company 
were commonly included in the deed of settlement.55 A database of com-
pany constitutions from the period, collected by Professor Robin Pear-
son, gives a quantitative sense of the frequency with which companies 
indemnified their trustees. Of the 209 unincorporated joint stock compa-
nies in the sample that used the trust device, 168 (or 80%) provided in-
demnity for trustees.56 As a result, trustees for unincorporated joint stock 
companies were probably no harder to recruit than partners in a partner-
ship or directors of a corporation. Moreover, the traditional rules restrict-
ing the types of assets that could be held by a trust were clearly disre-
garded by the many businesses that used the trust device, and so must not 
have been binding. Finally, private arbitration served as an effective sub-
stitute for the Court of Chancery for dispute resolution.57 By the 1810s, it 
had become standard practice to include a provision in an unincorporated 
joint stock company’s constitution providing for arbitration of sharehold-
er disputes.58 
In the end, the proof is, as they say, in the pudding. The prevalence 
of the unincorporated joint stock company is strong evidence of its effi-
cacy as a substitute for incorporation.59 Lord Justice James, describing 
these companies, noted: 
They were large societies on which the sun of royal or legislative 
favour did not shine, and as to whom the whole desire of the associ-
ates, and the aim of the ablest legal assistance they could obtain was 
to make them as nearly a corporation as possible, with continuous 
existence, with transmissible and transferable stock, but without any 
                                                 
 53. HARRIS, supra note 1, at 152–53. 
 54. Id. at 162–64. 
 55. See DUBOIS, supra note 35, at 218; FREEMAN ET AL., supra note 34, 189–90. 
 56. Calculation based on database from R. Pearson et al., Constructing the Company: Govern-
ance and Procedures in British and Irish Joint Stock Companies, 1720–1844, UK DATA SERVICE 
(2007), http://discover.ukdataservice.ac.uk/catalogue/?sn=5622&type=Data%20catalogue. 
 57. DUBOIS, supra note 35, at 221. 
 58. FREEMAN ET AL., supra note 34, at 61. 
 59. Thus, Robin Pearson notes the “dilemma inherent in Harris’s portrayal of unincorporated 
joint-stock enterprises at once as proliferating, economically important, and inefficient . . . .” Robin 
Pearson & Ron Harris, Industrializing English Law: Entrepreneurship and Business Organization, 
1720–1844, 54 ECON. HIST. REV. 555, 555 (2001) (book review). 
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individual right in any associate to bind the other associate, or to 
deal with the assets of the association.60 
By 1844, on the eve of the passage of the first general incorporation 
law, there were some 947 joint stock companies in business in England, 
employed with particular frequency in the mining and insurance indus-
tries.61 Thus, even if one accepts that use of the unincorporated joint 
stock company was significantly inhibited by the legal framework—a 
proposition I have tried to challenge here—explaining its use for some 
enterprises but not others requires a better understanding of the choices 
of entrepreneurs. 
C. Evidence from Registrations Under the Joint Stock Companies Act 
Several scholars have examined the response to the enactment of 
the Joint Stock Companies Act62 in 1844, which provided for the creation 
of joint stock companies with transferable shares by mere registration of 
the company, to gauge whether the preexisting legal regime was holding 
back the economy. The idea is that if the prior law was a substantial con-
straint, then we should see a boom in company formation upon passage 
of the Act. For example, Professor Freeman and his coauthors assert 
“there was clearly a lowering in entry barriers to the corporate economy 
after 1844. By 1854, 3,677 companies had provisionally registered under 
the Companies Act, and 884 of these obtained complete registration.”63 
They contrast the number of complete registrations under the Act64 
with their estimate of about 1,400 joint stock companies in total founded 
before 1844, suggesting that in just ten years after passage of the Act the 
number of joint stock companies increased by over 50%.65 Harris simi-
larly interprets the number of registrations under the 1844 Act as sup-
porting his thesis that, prior to the Act, business organization law held 
back the British economy, writing: 
[N]ot only did the act of 1844 transform the legal framework of 
business organization, but it also led to a dramatic increase in the 
                                                 
 60. COOKE, supra note 10, at 85. 
 61. HUNT, supra note 1, at 87–88. Note that not all of these firms were unincorporated joint 
stock companies using the trust. 
 62. Joint Stock Companies Act, 1844, 7 & 8 Vict., c. 110 (Eng.). 
 63. FREEMAN ET AL., supra note 34, at 35. 
 64. The Joint Stock Companies Act required a two-step registration process: provisional regis-
tration was required before promoters could make public their plans to form the company and solicit 
interest among investors, and complete registration was required upon filing of its organizing docu-
ments signed by shareholders in order to enjoy the various corporate characteristics bestowed by the 
Act. See Joint Stock Companies Act, 1844, 7 & 8 Vict., c. 110 §§ IV, VII (Eng.). 
 65. FREEMAN ET AL., supra note 34, at 35. 
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number of joint-stock business corporations, evidence of the lifting 
of a hitherto imposed constraint, changing business practices, or 
both.66 
However, there are several problems with using the number of reg-
istrations under the Joint Stock Companies Act to gauge the extent to 
which manufacturing firms in the modern sector were significantly re-
stricted by the preexisting legal regime. First, the Act allowed existing 
unincorporated joint stock companies and partnerships to register under 
the Act.67 Among the 884 complete registrations in the first decade of the 
Act cited by Freeman et al. are thus some number of existing companies. 
Second, the vast majority of these companies were not in manufacturing. 
Two industries particularly common among companies registered in the 
early years were gas and transportation.68 
A more relevant figure for evaluating the extent to which the preex-
isting legal regime held back manufacturing is the total number of new 
manufacturing firms registered in the first decade after the Act. Table 1 
below reports the number of manufacturing firms completely registered 
under the Act between the years 1845 and 1854, broken down into com-
panies I could confirm were already in existence prior to the Act and new 
companies. The names of the companies are provided in the table in the 
Appendix. The number of new manufacturing firms registered under the 
Act over this period was eighty-six, or an average of less than nine per 







                                                 
 66. HARRIS, supra note 1, at 288. 
 67. All existing joint stock companies, defined to include partnerships with more than twenty-
five partners or with transferable interests, must register under the Act. See Joint Stock Companies 
Act, 1844, 7 & 8 Vict., c. 110 §§ II, LVII (Eng.). Moreover, if an existing company meets the re-
quirements stated in the Act for new joint stock companies, it can also receive a certificate of com-
plete registration and enjoy the corporate features bestowed by the Act. Id. § LIX. 
 68. For example, of the fifty-seven complete registrations in 1845, twenty-seven were either 
gas or transportation/warehousing firms. See REPORT BY REGISTRAR OF JOINT STOCK COMPANIES 
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Table 1. Manufacturing Companies Completely Registered, 1845–1854 









9 10 14 5 8 1 4 14 12 9 86 
Total 12 13 16 5 8 1 4 14 12 9 94 
Source: Reports by the Registrar of Joint-Stock Companies, PP 1846, 1847, 1847-48, 1849, 1850, 
1851, 1852, 1853, 1854, 1854-55.  Companies were identified as already in existence prior to 1844 
from searches of the Parliamentary Papers and newspapers indicating that the company was active 
in prior years. 
 
 Finally, it is not clear what the appropriate baseline rate of com-
pany formation was to use as a comparison. Conceptually, we would 
want to know the rate of formation of manufacturing companies similar 
to these registered companies during the period prior to the Act. But 
without any comparable source of data in the prior period, when firms 
could be created with no formal registration recording their existence, 
this rate is simply unknown. 
In sum, the registration of firms under the 1844 Joint Stock Com-
panies Act does not in fact provide any evidence of a substantial con-
straint on the manufacturing sector being lifted upon passage of the Act. 
IV. EXPLAINING THE CHOICE OF THE PARTNERSHIP 
Given the effectiveness of the unincorporated joint stock company 
and the litany of failings of the partnership described above, the reasons 
for industrial entrepreneurs’ choice of the partnership form are not readi-
ly clear. As described above, the legal characteristics of the partnership 
form made it difficult for partnerships to attract equity investment from 
impersonal, formal capital markets through the issuance of transferable 
shares with limited liability. The resolution of this puzzle is, in short, that 
for the vast majority of firms in the modern sector it was optimal to use 
only debt, not equity, for any external financing, and the partnership 
form minimized the costs of debt financing. Moreover, the partnership 
form may have served to minimize agency costs among the owners of the 
firm as well as the agency costs between the firm’s owners and its man-
agement. 
A. The Pecking Order Theory of Capital Structure 
An important stylized fact in the modern literature on corporate fi-
nance is that managers generally prefer internal financing to external fi-
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nancing, and when they must resort to external finance, they prefer to 
issue debt rather than equity. Professor Stewart Myers termed this basic 
pattern in firm financing behavior the “pecking order theory” of capital 
structure.69 Consistent with this view, the majority of firm capital ex-
penditures are indeed financed by internally generated funds, and the 
overwhelming majority of external finance is in the form of debt.70 
The leading explanation for this empirical reality is based on 
asymmetric information between the managers of the firm and outside 
investors.71 If managers know more about the value of the firm’s busi-
ness prospects than outside investors do, this creates an adverse selection 
problem: the firms that decide to issue outside equity are the ones that 
outside investors overvalue. Issuing outside equity thus sends a bad sig-
nal about the firm’s prospects. Knowing this, outside investors are will-
ing to pay less for equity stakes in firms. This means that successful 
firms prefer to rely on internally generated sources of funds rather than to 
sell equity. And if a firm does seek to raise outside funds, it is better to 
do so with a “safer” security—debt—since as a fixed claim, the pricing 
of debt is less sensitive to the information asymmetry. 
B. Advantages of the Partnership Form 
The pecking order theory provides a useful framework for under-
standing the financing behavior of manufacturing firms in the modern 
sector and the advantages of the partnership form. 
1. The Sources of Capital for Industrial Firms 
Early on in the Industrial Revolution, the demand of industrial en-
trepreneurs for fixed capital was relatively modest.72 The fixed capital 
equipment in the early cotton mills and iron furnaces was inexpensive,73 
and there were only minimal economies of scale.74 Manufacturing firms 
also made extensive use of subcontracting certain aspects of production 
to other firms, which further lowered the need for aggregating fixed capi-
                                                 
 69. Stewart C. Myers, The Capital Structure Puzzle, 39 J. FIN. 575, 581 (1984). 
 70. Id. at 582. 
 71. See Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, Corporate Financing and Investment Deci-
sions When Firms Have Information That Investors Do Not Have, 13 J. FIN. ECON. 187 (1984). 
 72. See MATHIAS, supra note 1, at 78; MOKYR, supra note 4, at 101. 
 73. COTTRELL, supra note 6, at 20; PAT HUDSON, THE GENESIS OF INDUSTRIAL CAPITAL: A 
STUDY OF THE WEST RIDING WOOL TEXTILE INDUSTRY, C. 1750–1850, at 14–15 (1986); Sidney 
Pollard, Fixed Capital in the Industrial Revolution in Britain, 24 J. ECON. HIST. 299, 301 (1964). 
 74. CHEFFINS, supra note 47, at 154. 
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tal in a single firm.75 Entrepreneurs relied primarily on personal wealth 
and the wealth of family and friends for initial investment capital. Trade 
creditors were an important source of working capital, as suppliers gave 
firms time to settle accounts and merchants gave cash advances.76 Later 
in the period, country banks provided short-term loans to industrial firms, 
further expanding access to working capital.77 Mortgages were used to 
reduce the cost of credit to firms by offering lenders more effective secu-
rity interests in collateral.78 
As technology changed and the economy grew, the demand sched-
ule for capital investment shifted up. Consistent with the pecking order 
theory, firms financed this expansion in their capital stock primarily 
through the plow back of profits. Firms in the industrial sector were 
highly profitable.79 Furthermore, the external finance that was raised was 
primarily in the form of debt. Working capital provided by trade credi-
tors and bank loans allowed firms to devote their profits to long-term 
fixed capital investment.80 The opportunity cost to the firm of using in-
ternal earnings to finance capital investment was at least as great as the 
yield on the relatively risk-free government debt traded in London during 
the period. This rate varied through this period, increasing during the war 
period when government borrowing increased.81 
Importantly, manufacturing firms did not raise large sums of equity 
capital. Most partners in these firms were close associates, many with 
family connections.82 Equity was built up primarily through plow-back 
of profits, not by additional external equity investment.83 Nor did manu-
                                                 
 75. Pat Hudson, Industrial Organization and Structure, in THE CAMBRIDGE ECONOMIC 
HISTORY OF MODERN BRITAIN, VOLUME 1: INDUSTRIALIZATION 1700–1860, at 28, 39 (Roderick 
Floud & Paul Johnson eds., 2004). 
 76. COTTRELL, supra note 6, at 22; MATHIAS, supra note 1, at 77. 
 77. Usury laws capped interest that could be legally charged on commercial loans at about 5%. 
This may have restricted the availability of credit, in particular when the yield on government securi-
ties rose above the 5% limit and funds moved from the private sector into government debt, causing 
liquidity problems for manufacturers. COTTRELL, supra note 6, at 8. 
 78. See MATHIAS, supra note 1, at 79; Neal, supra note 13, at 163. 
 79. See COTTRELL, supra note 6, at 20; R. L. Downes, The Stour Partnership, 1726–39: A Note 
on Landed Capital in the Iron Industry, 3  ECON. HIST. REV. 90, 93 (1950). 
 80. Pollard, supra note 73, at 308. 
 81. Carol Heim and Philip Mirowski estimate that the nominal yield on government debt 
ranged from 3.14% to 6.09%, with real yields considerably more volatile. Carol E. Heim & Philip 
Mirowski, Interest Rates and Crowding-Out During Britain’s Industrial Revolution, 47 J. ECON. 
HIST. 117, 120 (1987). There is some question as to whether savers in the provinces actually held 
public debt in their portfolios, but evidence suggests that, increasingly, the government debt became 
an asset held economy-wide. See A. H. John, Insurance Investment and the London Money Market 
of the 18th Century, 20 ECONOMICA 137, 142–43 (1953). 
 82. Postan, supra note 6, at 4. 
 83. See COTTRELL, supra note 6, at 23, 31. 
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facturing firms attract credit from a distance; creditors were local,84 and 
thus had better information about the firm and its management and were 
more likely to engage in repeated interactions with the firm. 
2. The Unrealizable Advantage of the Joint Stock Form 
Consider then the implications of this pecking order financing be-
havior—relying almost exclusively on retained earnings and debt—for 
entrepreneurs’ choice of legal form. The legal characteristics of the unin-
corporated joint stock company would have allowed these firms to issue 
transferable shares and thus receive equity investment from a wider cir-
cle of investors. However, the optimal financing behavior by these firms 
was to rely only on debt and not on outside equity, making the primary 
advantage of the unincorporated joint stock company of little use.85 
Moreover, even for entrepreneurs that would have liked to issue 
equity, it seems unlikely that a primary or secondary market in industrial 
shares could actually have formed, given the underdevelopment of the 
capital market in the period. The capital markets were not yet ready to 
support the sort of “venture capital” investment these firms represented. 
The extent to which a national, integrated capital market existed in 
this period has been debated in the literature.86 Buchinsky and Polak find 
that by the mid-eighteenth century, price movements of government se-
curities were correlated with real property transactions in the provinces, 
suggesting that London financial markets were linked to local capital 
markets.87 But this link seems likely to have been one-way. As Cottrell 
notes, “Whereas by the mid-1830s a national, albeit volatile, market for 
credit existed, there was not a comparable group of institutions mobiliz-
ing capital, particularly capital for industry.”88 While government securi-
ties would have been available to savers in the industrializing region, 
securities issued by industrial firms would have been unlikely to attract 
savers from afar. The stock market in London primarily traded govern-
ment securities, securities of the moneyed companies, and a small list of 
                                                 
 84. CHEFFINS, supra note 47, at 152; COTTRELL, supra note 6, at 35 (“Loan capital was more 
mobile but normally only at a local or regional level . . . .”); HUDSON, supra note 73, at 19 (“The 
bulk of short- and long-term loan finance seems to have taken place within a narrow geographical 
area and mainly comprised transactions between people related to each other personally, by religion 
or through business involvement.”). 
 85. For a similar argument, see CHEFFINS, supra note 47, at 153 (“The fact industrialists during 
the industrial revolution were disinclined to seek outside investment also constrained the develop-
ment of large-scale corporate enterprise.”). 
 86. See Heim & Mirowski, supra note 81, at 117; Moshe Buchinsky & Ben Polak, The Emer-
gence of a National Capital Market in England, 1710–1880, 53 J. ECON. HIST. 1 (1993). 
 87. See Heim & Mirowski, supra note 81, at 117; Buchinsky & Polak, supra note 86. 
 88. COTTRELL, supra note 6, at 34. 
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dock and canal companies.89 Financial intermediaries, such as insurance 
companies, invested their funds primarily in government debt and issues 
of the moneyed companies.90 This is consistent with the fact that the 
firms’ supply of capital was overwhelmingly from local sources, suggest-
ing that information problems in funding these firms were severe. This 
was in part due to a geographical gap between the savings in London and 
agricultural regions, and the manufacturing firms in the industrializing 
regions.91 Furthermore, modern institutions requiring public disclosure of 
information and auditing of financial statements were not yet in place.92 
Finally, the new technologies invested in by industrial firms had to exac-
erbate information asymmetries.93 
3. The Advantages of the Partnership 
In addition, the partnership form was the optimal legal platform for 
a debt-financed business. In particular, the unlimited liability of partners 
for partnership debts would have lowered the firm’s cost of borrowing, 
especially from trade creditors. Each partner was jointly and severally 
liable for the debts of the firm, and thus the pool of collateral available to 
firm creditors included the personal assets of partners. In contrast, the 
owners of corporations enjoyed limited liability. Unincorporated joint 
stock companies were structured to mimic the legal characteristics of the 
corporate form, including limited liability. The liability of the firm’s 
managers and owners was typically limited through provisions in the 
firm’s governance documents and in its contracts with creditors.94 The 
fact that so many joint stock companies had limited liability would have 
made such firms, as a class, appear to be less creditworthy. While corpo-
rations and unincorporated joint stock companies could, in principle, 
write contracts that made the firm’s owners explicitly liable on its debts, 
trade creditors seem especially unlikely to have bargained for recourse to 
the firm’s owners’ personal assets. In contrast, the strong norm of per-
sonal liability of partners might have made creditors generally more 
comfortable lending to partnerships. 
The unlimited liability of partners also reduced their incentive to act 
opportunistically vis-à-vis the firm’s creditors. Knowing that their own 
                                                 
 89. MATHIAS, supra note 1, at 73. 
 90. See John, supra note 81, at 144–46. 
 91. MATHIAS, supra note 1, at 73; CHEFFINS, supra note 47, at 152 (“[S]ince capital markets  
remained primarily regional in orientation, industrialists minded to raise capital to build up their 
firms were generally poorly positioned to appeal to investors outside their locality.”). 
 92. See CHEFFINS, supra note 47, at 194. 
 93. See MOKYR, supra note 4, at 106. 
 94. See supra notes 34–37 and accompanying text. 
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assets were on the line made partners less likely to take on more debt 
than could be repaid or to engage in other forms of opportunism. 
These advantages of the partnership form were well understood by 
entrepreneurs at the time. Some partnerships explicitly advertised to their 
creditors and customers the unlimited liability of partners.95 One Man-
chester manufacturer argued that if liability were limited in partnerships, 
failure of success would be shielded from reproach; the law would 
become the refuge of a trading skulk . . . . The position of our mer-
cantile character is a treasured object, and demands of the best secu-
rity we can obtain for upholding of it. On that account we cannot 
hesitate to prefer the security of a man who without reservation, of-
fers to stake his whole property and the treasured estimate of his 
own respectability upon the result . . . as against the pretensions of 
another who requires to be fenced in by conditions.96 
This argument does not explain, however, why firms did not make 
use of the unincorporated joint stock company to achieve liquidation pro-
tection. This feature would have been useful independent of the firm’s 
financing behavior, and it seems likely that the specificity of investment 
in these firms was generally increasing. Perhaps the close relationships 
among partners obviated the need for this additional legal protection 
against premature liquidation of firm-specific assets. 
Moreover, there is a countervailing benefit to the ability of partners 
to potentially force dissolution of the partnership. Professors Naomi 
Lamoreaux and Jean-Laurent Rosenthal examine the American context 
and argue that the ability of partners to force dissolution of the partner-
ship acted as a check against opportunism by controlling owners vis-à-
vis minority owners and that this explains the continued prevalence of 
the partnership in manufacturing in the United States into the twentieth 
century.97 The greater control rights of partners over firm affairs, relative 
to the control rights of corporate shareholders, might have similarly 
helped to keep in check opportunistic behavior among partners. 
Finally, in most industrial partnerships the partners were all active 
in managing the business.98 The individual managers in partnerships in-
                                                 
 95. Anderson & Tollison, supra note 20, at 115. 
 96. HUNT, supra note 1, at 117–18. 
 97. Naomi R. Lamoreaux & Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, Corporate Governance and the Plight of 
Minority Shareholders in the United States Before the Great Depression, in CORRUPTION AND 
REFORM: LESSONS FROM AMERICA’S ECONOMIC HISTORY 125 (Edward L. Glaeser & Claudia 
Goldin eds., 2006). 
 98. Note that this argument is about the effect of the economic relationships embodied in the 
typical partnership rather than about the legal characteristics of the partnership form. A close corpo-
ration could achieve the same incentive effects. 
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ternalized a greater proportion of the returns from their efforts than the 
managers of a joint stock company with widely held shares.99 Partners 
thus had better incentives to exert effort and make efficient decisions in 
managing the firm. Furthermore, the close relationships among partners 
in these firms surely resulted in greater sympathy among partners than 
could be achieved between the management and shareholders of a joint 
stock company, fiduciary duties notwithstanding. Partners were motivat-
ed not just to receive their own cut, but so that their fellow partners pros-
pered as well. 
The concern that delegating control would result in mismanagement 
was reflected in the popular pamphlets distributed in the period.100 And 
contemporary political economists shared this view, including, perhaps 
most famously, Adam Smith, who wrote: 
The directors of [joint stock companies], . . . being the managers ra-
ther of other people’s money than of their own, it cannot be well 
expected, that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigi-
lance with which the partners in a private copartnery frequently 
watch over their own. . . . Negligence and profusion, therefore, must 
always prevail, more or less, in the management of the affairs of 
such a company. . . . They have, accordingly, very seldom succeed-
ed without an exclusive privilege; and frequently have not succeed-
ed with one.101 
Smith believed that the only industries in which joint stock compa-
nies could be successful without some exclusive privilege from the state 
were those “of which all the operations are capable of being reduced to 
what is called a routine, or to such a uniformity of method as admits of 
little or no variation.”102 This was echoed by The Economist some eighty 
years later in 1854, which argued that joint stock organization was work-
able only in undertakings that would 
admit of being carried on according to a regular systematic plan. . . . 
Companies were in all respects unsuited for the prosecution of ordi-
nary industrial pursuits, whether belonging to agriculture, manufac-
tures or commerce. None had ever succeeded without some special 
                                                 
 99. For a classic account of the agency costs inherent in the “separation of ownership from 
control,” see Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). 
 100. DUBOIS, supra note 35, at 27. 
 101. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND THE CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS 264–65 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1976) (1776). 
 102. Id. at 279. Anderson and Tollison present an able defense of Smith’s ideas as an early 
expression of modern information economics. See Gary M. Anderson & Robert D. Tollison, Adam 
Smith’s Analysis of Joint Stock Companies, 90 J. POL. ECON. 1237 (1982). 
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privilege. . . . To buy in one market; to sell with profit in another; to 
watch over perpetually occurring variations in the prices, and in the 
supply and demand of commodities; to suit with dexterity and 
judgment the quantity and quality of goods to the wants of each 
market; and to conduct each operation in the best and cheapest 
manner, requires a degree of unremitting vigilance and attention 
which it would be visionary to expect from the directors or servants 
of a joint stock association.103 
V. CONCLUSION 
The legal framework of business organization adapted well to the 
needs of industrial entrepreneurs in England during the Industrial Revo-
lution. While access to incorporation was restricted, the unincorporated 
joint stock company stood by as an able substitute for the corporation. 
However, during this period the corporateness that could be achieved 
was not yet desirable. Stock markets and financial intermediaries had yet 
to catch up with the functionality offered by the legal system. Further-
more, other legal underpinnings of a modern capital market, such as a 
comprehensive securities regulation scheme, were not yet in place. Final-
ly, features of the partnership made it well suited to minimize the agency 
costs of collective enterprise. Eventually, the economic needs and oppor-
tunities of entrepreneurs evolved, making the business corporation the 
dominant form of organization in modern economic life. 
England was not alone in this experience; entrepreneurs in the 
United States similarly opted for the partnership form for most manufac-
turing firms, even after the passage of general incorporation statutes, 
providing further evidence that the widespread use of the partnership was 
not a function of the British legal system.104 
There were some industries during the Industrial Revolution that 
did make extensive use of the joint stock form, particularly in insurance 
and mining, but also in the woolen textiles industry. Why the wool and 
cotton industries opted for different legal forms is not immediately obvi-
ous; they would appear to have had similar requirements for fixed capital 
investment. Exploring and explaining variation across industries is an 
important area of future research. 
  
                                                 
 103. HUNT, supra note 1, at 132. 
 104. As late as 1900, 67% of all U.S. manufacturing firms owned by more than one person 
were organized as partnerships. Lamoreaux & Rosenthal, supra note 97, at 129. 
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APPENDIX 
Year New manufacturing   





completely registered  
1845 Combmartin and North Devon 
Smelting Company 
Nister Dale Iron Company 
National Glass Company of Ire-
land 
Ammon Vale Iron and Coal 
Company 
London and Manchester Glass 
Company 
Patent Cork Cutting Company 
Wigton Joint Stock Brewery 
Company 
Wilder’s Burton Brewery Com-
pany 
Patent Fuel Company 
 
Claughton Garth Mill 
Company 
Birmingham Plate and 
Crown Glass Compa-
ny 
Ipswich Paper Mill 
 
1846 Kingston Cotton Mill Company 
Dacca Sugar Company 
Hull Glass Company 
Plymouth, Stonehouse, and 
Devonport Grinding and Baking 
Company 
Royal Irish Railway Carriage 
Company 
Union Mill Company 
Burnley Cotton Twist Company 
Banwen Iron and Coal Company 
United General Bread and Flour 
Company, for Plymouth, Stone-
ham, and Devonport 
Compressed Air Engine Compa-
ny 
 
Union Plate Glass 
Company 
Wylam’s Steam Fuel 
Company 
Patent Galvanized Iron 
Company 
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1847 British Patent Naphtha Compa-
ny. 
West of England Patent Refining 
Sugar Company  
League Bread Company 
Liverpool Union Mill and Bread 
Company 
Bury Saw Mill Company 
Patent Alkali Company 
La Bella Raguel Company 
Patent Metal Cored Railway 
Sleeper Company 
Hemp and Flax Manufacturing 
Company 
Poole Steam Flour Mill Compa-
ny 
Pembrokeshire Iron and Coal 
Company 
Boston and Thorp Arch Bath 
Company 
Saunders Brewery Company 
Patent Tidal Wheel Company 
 
Birmingham Union 
Coal and Coke Com-
pany 
Price’s Patent Candle 
Company 
1848 Torbay Steam Flour Mill and 
Ship Biscuit Manufacturing 
Company 
Low’s Patent Copper Copmany 
National Disinfected and Dry 
Manure Company 
Devon and Cornwall Tanning 
and Leather Company 
Albion Plate-Glass Company 
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1849 Coggeshall Patent Plush Manu-
facturing Company 
Dalston Joint Stock Brewery 
Company 
Worksop Proprietary Mill Com-
pany 
Fire Annhilator Company 
Combined Vapour Engine Com-
pany 
Union Tin Smelting Company 
Bute Dock Brick Company 








1851 Harrington Patent Slip Compa-
ny. 
Great Peat Working Company of 
Ireland. 
British Peat Charcoal and Ma-
nure Company 
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1852 Steam Gondola Company 
Lee Moor Porcelain Clay Com-
pany 
Bristol Joint Stock Provision and 
Clothing Company 
London and Parisian Bread 
Company 
London Cork Cutting Company 
Working Tailors’ Joint Stock 
Company 
British Sporm Candle Company 
Whit Lane Weaving Company 
Patent Wire Type Company 
Shale Manure and Naphtha 
Company 
Patent Cooperage Company 
National Patent Steam Fuel 
Company 
Metropolitan Carriage Company 
Paris Chocolate Company 
 
 
1853 Llynvi Vale Iron Company 
Pantagraphic Cutting, Carving, 
and Engraving Company 
Patent Siliceous Stone Company 
Groux’s Improved Soap Com-
pany 
London and Penzance Serpen-
tine Company 
Patent Glass Silvering Company 
British and Colonial Smelting 
and Reduction Company 
Bonwen’s Patent Candle Com-
pany 
Great Central Bread, Flour, and 
Biscuit Company 
British Patent Cork-cutting 
Company 
New Linares Mining and Smelt-
ing Company 
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1854 Crystal Palace and Suburban 
Brick and Tile Company 
United Kingdom Vinegar Com-
pany 
Antifriction Screw propeller and 
Marine Carriage Company 
Fortuna Company 
Berdan Machine Company 
Superphosphate Compost Com-
pany 
London Patent Brick Company 
British Sugar Refining Company 
Surrey Manure Company. 
 
 
Source: Reports by the Registrar of Joint-Stock Companies, PP 1846, 
1847, 1847–48, 1849, 1850, 1851, 1852, 1853, 1854, 1854–55.  Compa-
nies were identified as already in existence prior to 1844 from searches 
of the Parliamentary Papers and newspapers indicating that the company 
was active in prior years. 
 
